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HARMONIZATION AROUND RESULTS REPORTING:
A SYNTHESIS OF FOUR COUNTRY STUDIES

T

by Elizabeth M. White, Rosalía Rodriguez-García, and Rema Balasundaram*
INTRODUCTION

his article discusses “harmonization around results
reporting” within the international context of improving
aid effectiveness. It seeks to shed light on the inter-relationship between external reporting for donors and internal
reporting for national accountability. Harmonization refers to
increased coordination and stream-lining of activities by different aid agencies based on the sharing of information in order to
promote transparency and improve coordination; gradual simplification of procedures and requirements to reduce their burden on partner governments; and development of common
arrangements for planning, managing, and delivering aid. The
concept is often expanded, like in this article, to also include
issues of alignment and ownership. Examples of such issues are:
(1) the government taking the lead in coordinating donor efforts;
(2) donors relying on country systems and procedures; and (3)
development agencies delivering aid in accordance with partner
country priorities.
Section I provides a brief description of the international context for harmonization around results reporting. Section II summarizes the evolution to harmonization in four country cases –
Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Section III
proposes three critical factors that shed light on how to deepen
efforts for harmonization around results reporting. Each country
context is unique and has unique leverage points for action around
harmonization. Therefore, this article does not attempt to provide
operational steps for moving toward harmonization. Instead it
captures experiences and draws lessons that might be applied to
these and other countries; mainly, that there is progress, but it is
slow and not easy. Additionally, this article assesses three critical
factors found to deepen efforts for harmonization around results
reporting: (1) developing a reliable basis for reporting; (2) fostering country ownership of results reporting processes – the primacy of country defined results, as opposed to externally driven
results; and (3) providing programmatic, rather than project only,
coordinated support for national systems.

GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR HARMONIZATION

At the Monterrey International Conference on Financing
for Development1 in 2002, as donors pledged significant
increases in aid levels, they recognized the need for development agencies and partner countries to strengthen their focus on
results and development effectiveness. They also acknowledged
that achieving results requires better use of resources, and that
better aid, not just more aid, is part of donor responsibility.
Since then, the need to better manage for results—to use information to improve decision-making and steer country-led devel33

opment processes toward clearly defined goals—has become a
central element of the global development agenda. This commitment to better manage for results was renewed and increased
in the 2004 Marrakech International Roundtable on Managing
for Development Results,2 the 2005 Paris High-Level Forum on
Harmonization, Alignment, and Results,3 and the 2005 G8
Gleneagles Summit.4
The 2004 Global Monitoring Report5 shows that many
developing countries have made progress in accelerating
growth and reforming policies,6 for instance in the areas of
budget, financial management, and corruption in the public
service. Yet, while progress has been made, enormous development challenges still face low-income countries, especially in
Africa. This is coupled with new commitments to the doubling
of aid for Africa, recently made at the Gleneagles Summit, and
estimates that aid to all developing countries will increase by
around $50 billion per year by 2010. Much of this will go to
low-income countries, through the framework of their national
strategies (second generation poverty reduction strategies).
There will be increased expectations that these funds will be
effectively used in countries and will be driven by participatory and transparent development processes. The resounding
theme is that country-owned and -led development is critical to
achieving and sustaining results.

EVOLUTION OF HARMONIZATION AROUND
RESULTS REPORTING

Efforts to coordinate monitoring and reporting in programs
and sector wide approaches (“SWAPs”) played a significant role
in the move toward harmonization around results reporting.
Traditionally, reporting was concerned mainly with inputs
(finance) and outputs according to different donors’ formats and
reporting needs. With the introduction of SWAPs, donors were
increasingly confronted with more budget-wide financing than
project-specific financing. Donors were also faced with the need
to better coordinate reporting and use country systems, given the
situation that several donors support the same broad sectors or
programs in the public sector. This led to reporting requirements
at higher, more centralized levels as opposed to reporting in a
project-by-project manner. It also led to an enhanced appreciation of the need to strengthen country monitoring systems.

* This study was conducted for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development-Development Cooperation Directorate (“OECD/DAC’) Joint
Venture on Managing for Development Results. Elizabeth M. White is a Senior
Results Management Specialist at the World Bank. Rosalia Rodriguez-Garcia is
a Senior Specialist and Consultant to the World Bank. Rema Balasundaram is a
Consultant to the World Bank. The views expressed in this article are those of
the authors and cannot be attributed to the World Bank.
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Numerous other strategies to harmonize reporting results
followed SWAPs. The preparation of national development plans
(“NDPs”) and/or Poverty Reduction Strategies (“PRS”) provided both an opportunity and a vehicle to expand the dialogue on
results reporting to additional sectors and donors. It offered a
common basis for donors, government, and civil society to identify a strategic approach to poverty reduction, an operational
framework to achieve national goals, and a mechanism to develop cross-sector linkages. Conceptually, the strategy and programs in the PRS could easily translate into a monitoring system
for tracking progress. This would enable donors to select indicators associated with policy areas and use these for external
reporting. While the principles of the PRS promoted country
ownership, participation, and a focus on results, the demand for
results reporting was externally driven. During implementation,
efforts to harmonize around results reporting had mixed results.
The PRS process underscored the need for good reporting and
for strengthening countries’ capacity to report on results.

COUNTRY CONTEXT FOR RESULTS REPORTING

Many countries lacked monitoring and evaluation systems for
reporting, or the systems that were in place were fragmented and
overlapping. There was inadequate institutional and organizational capacity to establish coordinated monitoring systems,7 even
though for several years prior, donors had supported project monitoring and evaluation. Since few countries had taken a programmatic perspective in developing monitoring and evaluation systems, there was little analytical work on how to coordinate donor
support for strengthening country systems in a sustainable way.
Many countries did not yet recognize the value of using
results information in policy making processes or in program
management.8 Instead, they focused on tracking expenditures,
monitoring high order socio-economic indicators, and reporting
to donors. Countries concentrated less on how results information could be valuable for effective and efficient public sector
management. There was little experience to draw on for using
results information as part of public sector management and for
understanding the different requirements for information and
organization in results based approaches.
The introduction of PRS acted as a catalyst for a more coordinated approach to poverty monitoring. The increased demand for
reporting on results helped put governments and donors on a forward track in addressing data constraints. This translated into support for poverty monitoring systems, including efforts to increase
the participation of civil society and improve access to information. Much of donor support focused on the supply and coordination of data, such as conducting surveys or supporting the census.
Donor support otherwise tended to focus on each donor’s own
reporting requirements and priorities.9 Less attention was paid to
how results information would be used for government purposes,
such as policy making, budgeting, or management.

ADVANCEMENT TOWARDS A MORE HOLISTIC
UNDERSTANDING

There was little apparent recognition that harmonization
around results reporting could facilitate or impede progress in
FALL 2005

establishing sustainable country systems. Later, analytical work
began to evolve that assessed the use of information and the
broader institutional setting for monitoring. This included
increased attention to expenditure management, the flow of
information, and analytical/evaluation skills. This work helped
deepen the debate and understanding of the complexities of
developing a poverty monitoring system and the importance of
balancing the various roles that the monitoring system was
expected to serve, such as external accountability to donors, a
country tool for policy decisions, and in-country accountability
to citizens.
Over the same period, the international community intensified efforts for broadly improving aid effectiveness through better aid coordination and improved harmonization and alignment
across a range of activities. At the country level consultative
group meetings and other mechanisms for government-donor
coordination, such as sector working groups, offered a vehicle
for dialogue across specific subsets of donors. At the global
level, critical issues of aid effectiveness were being discussed
through high level round-tables and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development-Development
Cooperation Directorate (“OECD/DAC”) collaborative actions.
Important topics included improving the predictability and
reducing the volatility of aid, rethinking conditionality, and
deepening the understanding of country ownership. The international community also recognized the important role of managing for results as a key tool for countries. These global messages
and debates were increasingly supported at the country level, by
both countries and in-country donors, where the broad principles discussed in the global debates were made operational and
provided a useful basis for discussion of harmonization around
results reporting.

COUNTRY EXPERIENCES IN HARMONIZATION: THE
CASES OF MADAGASCAR, MOZAMBIQUE,
TANZANIA, AND UGANDA

All of the contextual factors outlined above played an
important role in progress toward results reporting in the four
country cases. The evolution of each country was unique and
helped to identify a number of elements that served to promote
and support harmonization around results reporting.
The experiences in these four countries demonstrate that the
development community is evolving in its understanding of the
country and international context that comes together in harmonization around results reporting. The four cases show that
externally driven results reporting systems present challenges to
the country-led model of development, and that a country-led
results reporting system can satisfy both the internal reporting
needs of countries and the external reporting needs of donors.
The cases also show that the donor community and countries are
together putting in place systems that serve country and donor
needs—albeit sometimes through trial and error. The review of
the four country cases shows that harmonization around results
reporting is facilitated by robust technical elements such as:
• Strategies and programs designed to enable continu-
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ous and systematic assessment against results-based
objectives.

• Supporting monitoring systems with well defined
indicators that cover monitoring of resource use
(financial and human), tangible outputs (such as efficient extension of services to farmers), intermediate
outcomes (such as improved use of inputs and new
farming techniques), outcomes (improved yields and
reduced losses from weather shocks), impacts
(improved agricultural productivity), and links to
broader national objectives (such as increased agricultural exports).
• Well defined and reliable data that are feasible to collect and simple to monitor.

• Analytical capacity to translate routine monitoring
information into evidence to support decisions
including cost benefits.

Experience is also showing that technical solutions alone
are not sufficient. Equally important are the following:
• Country ownership of the programs, as well as the
existence of incentives to use information on results
in expenditure decisions (with links to the budget or
medium-term expenditure frameworks). This
includes balancing country accountability with external accountability.
• Institutional arrangements for reinforcing how information flows would be used.

• Understanding of the political nature of results
reporting.

MADAGASCAR

The highly participatory PRS process, harmonization
around sector wide approaches, the drive for enhanced country
monitoring systems, and achievement of sustainable results on
the ground from the National Environmental Action Plan
(“NEAP”) all contributed to an evolution and progress in the
harmonization agenda around results in Madagascar.
Harmonization around results reporting in this country commenced with the implementation and coordination efforts of a
group of donors in the context of environment and biodiversity
in the early 1990s. Madagascar’s unique background as an
island nation, endemic to many of the world’s endangered
species, and highly vulnerable to shocks, provided many lessons
on harmonization in the context of the environment and its
broader application to issues of results and sustainability for
PRSs as a whole. Lessons on harmonization around results
reporting were derived from the environment sector and its
implementation, even in the context of its PRS program and
recent efforts to strengthen the Poverty Monitoring System
(“PMS”).
Madagascar was the first country in Africa to elaborate a
NEAP. This occurred six years prior to the signing of the
Convention on Biological Diversity. The first phase of the
35

NEAP was initiated in 1991 in the face of a limited conservation
baseline with the support of a broad coalition of bilateral donors.
These donors included Germany, France, Norway, Switzerland,
and the United States; multilateral institutions, such as the
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) and the
World Bank; and non-governmental organizations, namely
Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund, and Wildlife
Conservation Society.10 A Multi-Donor Secretariat, which was
co-financed by USAID, France, and the World Bank, was set up
during the second phase of the NEAP to carry out coordination
and enhance implementation of the program. Multi donor supervision missions have been conducted twice a year since 1996.11
Recently, Japan and the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”)
have also joined this group.
Donors began to harmonize budget support assistance in
2003. Several activities in the mid-1990s lay the groundwork for
a coherent PMS in Madagascar.12 Lessons on harmonization
around results reporting, and monitoring and evaluation, in the
environment sector provided useful lessons for donors in shaping results oriented program formulation, planning, monitoring
of results, and evaluation over a period of time. It was not clear
that donors and the Government had taken these lessons into
account in the design of current programs.

MOZAMBIQUE

The evolution to harmonization around results reporting
started with improved links between sector strategies and
national results. Mozambique has a long tradition of planning in
the public sector. This planning is centrally-driven and relies on
a sector-based approach. Historically, sector policies have been
aligned with donor priorities. However, over time donors and
the government observed a weak link between these sector policies and the national budgeting and priority setting process. In
2001, the introduction of the Plano de Acçao de Reduçao da
Pobreza Absoluta (“PARPA”),13 Mozambique’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Plan (“PRSP”), helped improve alignment
of sector strategies to national objectives. It also brought greater
coherence across sectors and improved policy coherence of sector strategies with the government’s overall policy thrust.14
The PARPA, coupled with the medium-term expenditure
framework (“MTEF”) process, which was first formulated in
1998, included detailed plans, timelines, and indicators. This
formed the basis for developing monitoring systems that built
on already existing mechanisms. Donors supported the PARPA
through budget support, sector wide approaches, and project
financing. While some form of budget support had been delivered through the 1980s and 1990s,15 it was linking budget support to the PARPA that led to increased coordination among
donors and initiatives in support of harmonization and alignment.16 In 2002, preparation of a detailed matrix of PARPA
activities by sector revealed a need to make information about
PARPA priorities more systematic and to monitor a meaningful
number of indicators.17
The Government led a process to define a performance
assessment framework, requesting all PARPA sector ministries
and those responsible for cross-cutting reforms to identify priSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

orities for the coming three years. This resulted in a 56-page
Matrix, called the long Performance Assessment Framework
(“PAF”), which was then reduced to a short PAF consisting of
two pages of key priorities.
As part of reporting, there were a series of annual exercises
that led to issuances of reports to Parliament on the progress in
PARPA implementation. The government integrated the
required annual progress review (“APR”) of the PARPA into its
own regular reviews of implementation. This dual role for the
Balan o do PES – reporting to Parliament and to donors – simplifies national reporting requirements and “provides an adequate evaluation of the progress made in achieving the PARPA
goals.” Unfortunately, a 2004 independent review noted that
only a few donors comply with government reporting requirements, and donors have failed in attempts to reduce the government's administrative burden. While both donors and government have demonstrated a commitment individually and jointly,
the future will likely require even greater efforts if progress on
harmonization in results reporting is to continue.

the PRS action plan and the PAF over a three year period. In
2002, the government and donors created the Tanzanian
Assistance Strategy, which included guidance on harmonization
around results reporting, such as integration of reporting and
accountability systems. It also attempts to better align donor
support with the use of country systems. There are on-going
efforts to improve the basis for results reporting. However, there
remains a lack of incentive to produce good quality data and to
use results information in policy and budget decisions. Attempts
to link the PMS with public sector management have started.
Finally, in the current budget cycle, the procedure for collecting sector inputs is being modified in a way to put pressure
on all sectors to justify their bids in terms of the relevant cluster
strategies in the PRS. Sector policy makers have thus an
increased incentive to develop outcome-oriented rationales for
what they do with their allocations from public resources and
make use of data on results.21 Tanzania has progressed considerably in moving to a results-based planning and monitoring
reporting system.

Efforts for harmonization around results reporting in
Tanzania started at a low point in government-donor relations in
the early 1990s. At this time there was a large donor community, high aid dependency,18 high transaction costs in dealing with
the range of uncoordinated priorities, and the associated procedural and reporting requirements of multiple donors. In 1995, an
independent evaluation of donor/government relationships
resulted in a commitment to development cooperation and
establishment of a mutual accountability mechanism.19
Tanzania and its development partners were also using sector
wide approaches to create opportunities for coordinated work in
support of sector specific results. However, weak monitoring
systems undermined the utility of the sector wide approaches for
harmonization around results reporting.
The donor community had a good grasp of systems and
technical issues and wanted to deal with the myriad of systems
in place. At the same time, the government was aware that
strengthening public financial management systems and introducing effective poverty monitoring was a precondition for persuading donors to allocate more development assistance through
budget support.20 In 1999, the introduction of the RSP and focus
on PMS provided an opportunity for Tanzania to advance harmonization of results reporting. The PRS included targets and
indicators intended to inform programming decisions, and comprehensive institutional arrangements for assembling, analyzing, and disseminating poverty data. The PRS annual progress
report provided an opportunity for donors to use government
reporting for common results reporting.
In practice, the annual reviews were somewhat insubstantial, resulting in donors working on parallel policy and reporting
matrices. Budget support donors developed a performance
assessment framework to which budget support instruments
were linked, helping to harmonize results reporting for donors.
However, there was a disconnect between the donor-driven PAF
and the government’s PRS requiring further harmonization of

The move toward poverty reduction and reforms in 1986
and international pressures for demonstrating the effectiveness
of aid set the conditions for harmonization around results reporting in Uganda.22 Uganda was able to qualify as the first heavily-indebted poor country (“HIPC”) beneficiary, because as early
as 1997, it had put in place a strong domestically owned poverty reduction and development policy framework locally known
as the poverty eradication action plan (“PEAP”), later transformed into the PRS.
Except for a few exceptional circumstances in which external development assistance is reported to have been managed
below general expectations, Uganda’s case displays a success
story of aid effectiveness. This is evidenced through the gains
made in recent years, especially in the social (education and
health) sectors, where aid resources have had remarkable impact
on growth and social development indicators. Most of the
achievements in these and other sectors are largely attributable
to an improved and enabling policy environment reflected in the
budget process and improvements in public finance management, and a series of anti-corruption initiatives accompanied by
a high degree of transparency and accountability in the use of
public resources.
The evolution of harmonization in Uganda is characterized by a strong country ownership/leadership in undertaking
essential reforms and improving management of the aid portfolio to enhance effectiveness. Uganda was one of the first
countries in the sub-Saharan African region to have fully
developed its own PEAP as early as 1997. This has continued
to play a central role in fostering country ownership of the
development policy process, especially towards ensuring sustainability of the achievements. PEAP objectives have been
increasingly realized through a strong ownership of the development process as led by the Ministry of Finance Planning and
Economic Development. Additionally, the PEAP were coupled
with the development of a holistic national strategy against

TANZANIA
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UGANDA
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hard budget constraints and anchored in a medium term expenditure framework.
These achievements encouraged development partners to
shift their approaches and practices toward a country-led partnership model. Movement toward budget support and sector
wide approaches helped reinforce country ownership and donor
partnerships. There were efforts by the government to enhance
the results orientation of its strategy, monitoring, and processes.23 Efforts to demonstrate results were institutionalized out of
a rational, outcome-oriented budget process focusing on domestic accountability as well as external accountability through
mechanisms such as budget support instruments, e.g., the World
Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit. A hard budget constraint and the MTEF have been the key financing channels for
the PEAP. Uganda’s social economic performance highlights
the fact that achieving results requires better use of resources.
All stakeholders in Uganda’s development process have for the
last four years actively participated in the national budget formulation process with a view to ensuring that public resources
are channeled to those areas where they will have quick and sustained impact on poverty while contributing to sustainable economic growth.
Over time, the quality of the monitoring and evaluation systems supporting results reporting improved and some donors
harmonized around results reporting, especially in budget support, sector programs in health/education, and national multisector programs such as HIV/AIDs. There are also increased
efforts to develop more sector wide approaches in addition to
health and education (i.e., water, energy, agriculture, public
service reform, and procurement, among others). However,
weaknesses in country monitoring and evaluation systems are
still a factor in full donor reliance on Uganda’s monitoring system for results reporting. There has been recent progress in
developing Uganda’s monitoring and evaluation system through
the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation strategy
(“NIMES”). Challenges remain in how to make best use of
information on implementation of the PEAP in the domestic
policy making processes.

KEY FACTORS IN TURNING HARMONIZATION
CONCEPTS INTO PRACTICE

As the case-studies demonstrate, much work has been
undertaken and countries and donors are moving forward in
tackling technical and non-technical dimensions of harmonization around results reporting, but progress is slow and the
process challenging. Three critical factors have been identified
that shed light on how to deepen efforts for harmonization
around results reporting: (1) developing a reliable basis for
results reporting; (2) fostering country ownership of results
reporting; and (3) ensuring programmatic support for capacity
building in monitoring and evaluation.

FACTOR ONE: DEVELOPING A RELIABLE BASIS FOR
RESULTS REPORTING

Donors must report on country results of aid financing to
their domestic constituencies. The responsibility of donors is to
37

provide information on fiduciary accountability (money spent
and inputs/outputs) and on development effectiveness from the
aid provided (what are the benefits of the money spent). In order
for donors to use information from country systems for external
accountability, the information the systems provide must be reliable. In most countries, the information needed for results
reporting is not captured in country monitoring systems or is
patchy at best.
The absence of a results orientation often translates into
donors – rather than countries – identifying inputs-outcomes
links and associated indicators for results reporting, or reverting
to reporting on activities or disbursements. A recent review concluded that most indicators in monitoring systems for the PRS
are budgetary/expenditure (input indicators) and survey-based
measures of well-being, such as impact indicators for poverty
reduction.24 Less attention has been paid to articulating important intermediate steps that are responsive to shorter term measurement.25 Thus, while there are many issues with the technical
quality of data, a key bottleneck is the weak results orientation
in strategies and supporting processes.26 There are two concrete
actions that the donor community and countries can take to
strengthen this often overlooked dimension of harmonization
around results reporting: (1) develop stronger linkages between
policy actions and results; and (2) tailor results reporting to government policy processes.
In a results-based approach, there would be well established
links between policy choices and intended medium term outcomes, and how these would impact achievement of longer term
goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”).
These linkages should be based on sound analysis and identification of key constraints and priorities (evidence-based). For
harmonization around results reporting to be useful, indicators
would be responsive to program implementation or short term
policy actions, not only longer-term high level goals. What does
this mean in practice? Take for example a common objective of
countries and donors, “to make progress towards the MDG of
reducing income poverty.” To make progress in that direction,
countries will need to achieve the associated goal of increased
off-farm and on-farm income through medium term outcomes,
such as increased agricultural productivity. Knowing if the
country is on track to increased productivity requires short term
measures to help donors and governments know whether the
interventions, such as new farming techniques, improved land
tenure, and use of micro-finance, are working.
The Uganda PEAP provides an example of the difficulties
in developing a monitoring matrix that is useful for results
reporting and shows how donors and the government worked
together to address weaknesses in the basis for results reporting.
At design, most sectors did not articulate intended chains of causation. This resulted in monitoring matrices that were heavily
skewed toward final outcomes and impacts, missing specification of intermediate results from policy actions. Higher-level
indicators of progress towards the PEAP targets could only be
measured at relatively long intervals. Even when data was available, it was difficult to discern the causal contribution of the
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

PEAP to the changes in these indicators or to draw policy lessons from them. Some donors indicated that the PEAP was
insufficiently detailed to influence allocation decisions and was
unable to relate the expenditure on investment (policy and program decisions) to outputs (observable in the short-term) and
intermediate outcomes. This issue was addressed in the latest
PEAP revision, and work was initiated on the development of a
PEAP results and policy matrix. The PEAP matrix specifies the
key developmental results the PEAP is trying to bring about and
the annual policy actions that are expected to contribute to these
results. Indicators and targets are set both at the level of broad
developmental outcomes and at the level of policy actions. The
new matrix should ease both the management of PEAP implementation and the monitoring of progress with PEAP implementation. It will also be a useful tool to inform dialogue
between Government and a range of domestic and international
stakeholders.27
In several other countries, inadequately defined linkages
between inputs and expected outcomes in the PRS resulted in
donors developing performance assessment frameworks primarily for donor reporting purposes. These donors were then challenged with filling in the missing gaps in information needs.
Conceptually, the indicators in the PAF represented a subset of
indicators from the PRS. In practice, other indicators were often
negotiated by governments and donors providing broad budget
support.28 In Mozambique and Tanzania, useful processes for
coming to agreement on a set of results indicators and alignment
of relevant donors to the budgeting and reporting process of
government included discussions on the Performance
Assessment Framework (“PAF”) or donor specific results matrices, such as the World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(“PRSC”). In Uganda, the 2004 PEAP introduced a Policy
Matrix and a Results and Monitoring Matrix that started to bring
the PRSC and other monitoring and evaluation (“M&E”)
arrangements in line with the PEAP policy matrix. The PEAP
policy matrix will be the only instrument for assessing progress
towards attainment of PEAP objectives. This should result in
future iterations of the PEAP and supporting PMS to encompass
a broader range of results information, thus adding to its usefulness to donors for results reporting.29 These efforts evolved over
the initial years of PRS implementation and have been positive
steps toward harmonization around results reporting on budget
support.
There is a danger that donor negotiations can result in a proliferation of indicators as donors want to include their focal
areas or vertical programs with relevant indicators, into the
matrix. While there are obvious implications of this in terms of
data collection, monitoring, and reporting, the recent World
Bank Conditionality Review 200530 pointed out that this practice could lead to an increase in the number of conditions and
“the quality and relevance of the substance could suffer.”31
Additionally, this practice, if not done properly, could undermine country ownership, duplicate reporting mechanisms, and
miss opportunities to strengthen country capacity to use meaningful indicators for expenditure management and policy deciFALL 2005

sions. While the details of the debt proposal remain to be
worked out, one important result of this initiative will be to shift
more resources towards unrestricted budget support rather than
to specific projects or programs. This underscores the imperative for establishing processes that are supportive of strengthening country systems.
A key consideration for results reporting is how to make
results reporting a subset of a country monitoring and reporting
system that feeds into the policy process. Experience has shown
that: (1) monitoring systems only function where the participants see them as useful and legitimate; and (2) where the monitoring arrangements emerge out of a common commitment to
solving practical problems, they have a much greater chance of
success. Without tailoring results reporting to the policy
process, the risk is that monitoring results becomes more of a
requirement than a useful tool, often precipitating a decline in

BOX 1:

FILLING THE GAP IN POLICY LINKAGES:

TANZANIA POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT
In Tanzania, the Poverty Reduction Budget Support
(“PRBS”) instrument was launched by eleven bilateral
partners and the European Commission. These donor
partners coordinate support through a Performance
Assessment Framework (“PAF”) and Policy Matrix
formulated in 2001 as a basis for judging the government’s
performance on critical measures. The PAF defines the areas
of budget support dialogue and details monitor-able
actions, against which participating donors (fourteen)
assess progress in program implementation as the basis for
financing decisions. This was complemented by a
Structured Adjustment Loan (“SAL”) from the African
Development Bank and a Poverty Reduction Support Credit
(“PRSC”) by the World Bank. The PRSC policy measures
were coordinated by donors and the Government to the
existing PRBS policy matrix, and the PAF. The PAF was
extended to include a greater focus on rural incomes to
provide an adequate policy matrix for the PRSC1. During
November 2002, a revision of the PAF took place (in an
effort to align the PAF and the PRSC), while requirements
of the PRSC were incorporated into the Framework. The
Framework was expanded to include actions aimed at
poverty reduction (agriculture, private sector development,
and economic and social outcome indicators) and linked to
the MDGs, which are being monitored jointly by
government and donors as part of the annual reviews. This
resulted in the government and development partners
signing a “Partnership Framework Memorandum,”
declaring “…the intention of the parties to harmonize the
PRS action plan and the PAF completely within three years
(by 2005).”

OED/IEO Review of PRSP,
Tanzania Country Study (2004)
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the reliability of the information produced by the system. For
reliable results reporting, this implies that donors need to foster
increased ownership and use of monitoring systems by government by building on country processes.
The PRS established a process for review that provided an
opportunity to strengthen the use of country monitoring and
reporting systems. Each year, participating governments were
expected to produce a review of progress in implementation,
based on evidence, known as the APR. These reviews were originally conceived with donor reporting requirements in mind, but
many APRs have not provided sufficiently detailed information
for donors, focusing primarily on impact and outcome level
data. As a result, the APR has not been systematically used by
donors (see Box 2). Since the APRs were often viewed as an
external reporting requirement, they also were not systematically used by governments. A 2004 evaluation of the PRS noted
that “governments in most countries are monitoring results as a
requirement, and results are not being used to adjust strategies

BOX 2:

THE USE OF THE APR FOR
HARMONIZATION AROUND RESULTS
REPORTING
Donors have indicated that the APR is insufficiently
detailed to influence allocation decisions. Many donors
developed parallel reporting processes. Further
complicating matters, it has been reported that the “timing
of reporting is not always synchronized with other national
processes.” For project based lending, the same survey
showed that only 44 percent of donors use Government
information for monitoring purposes.

OECD-DAC survey (2004).

or to enhance accountability for performance.”32 Many of the
Joint Staff Assessments by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) stated that a major constraint for the
PRS implementation was weak integration of monitoring systems into the policy making and accountability process. Even in
the more successful cases of Tanzania and Uganda, there was
less focus on strengthening the links between deriving information for donors and how to make this useful for the
Government’s work reporting and policy processes.
There are also examples of harmonization around results
reporting in programs and projects. In many cases, harmonization around results reporting has evolved over time in a sector or
theme. Madagascar’s NEAP provides a good example of how
donors and government have evolved to harmonization around
results reporting. As NEAP moves to its third iteration, there is a
strong relationship between government and donors, based on an
agreed set of expected results and indicators. A joint steering
committee: (1) ensures that government and donor investments
are defined and implemented in a manner compatible with the
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results framework and agreed upon indicators; (2) monitors
progress towards agreed upon results; and (3) provides strategic
orientation and guidance for the overall program implementation
and coordination with other sectoral and development programs.
Participating donors (such as the World Bank, United Nations
Development Programme, and Global Environment Facility;
French, German, Japanese, Swiss, and U.S. bilateral programs;
Conservation International, World Wildlife Federation, and
Wildlife Conservation Society) are then able to use the M&E
system for their own results reporting. The M&E system with
common indicators enables a more direct linkage between financial sources and results on the ground, while avoiding the need
for donor coordination at the activity and input level. The process
is thus conducive to both harmonization around results reporting
and the reinforcement of government systems.33

FACTOR TWO: FOSTERING COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF
RESULTS REPORTING

Country ownership is essential to achieve development outcomes and to foster continuity in priority setting across political
cycles. The current context of increased aid flows and the associated need for external results reporting presents a challenge to
maintaining country ownership. The MDGs, the G-8 initiative,
and vertical programs to achieve specific outcomes (e.g. infrastructure, health, education)34 will likely increase pressure on
donors to report on progress toward international goals to external taxpayers. This may also encourage a greater funneling of
resources through vertical, sector-specific channels rather than
through country systems (see Box 3). Experience shows that, if
ignored, these pressures can translate into results reporting systems that track data for an external audience, but lack legitimacy
and ownership by those who are setting policies, implementing

BOX 3:

SPACE FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO
INNOVATE THEIR OWN FRAMEWORKS
AND PROCESSES
“We have learnt to come to terms with the reality that
development is a process, and that it can only be sustained
if it is owned and led by the targeted population.
Development cannot be imposed, it can only be facilitated;
it requires ownership, participation and empowerment, not
harangues and dictates. African countries … have to
assume full ownership and responsibility for their
development. Bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and
externally-funded NGOs …are entitled to demand
transparency and evidence of results. But they must be
ready to genuinely concede enough space for the African
countries to innovate, develop and pilot their policy
frameworks and processes.”

Tanzanian President Benjamin William Mkapa Keynote
speech, Africa Regional Workshop, Harmonization and
Alignment (Nov. 2004)
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programs, or monitoring results. A recent development committee
paper on aid effectiveness and aid financing explicitly notes that
“it is important to not undermine country ownership of the development agenda….the use of earmarked funds can cause distortions at the country level in terms of resource allocation, pressure
on implementing capacity, increased transaction costs, and misalignment with country-owned mechanisms such as PRSPs.”35
Uganda provides a positive example where external assistance is
aligned to the national goals and priorities, as reflected in the
PEAP, to ensure aid effectiveness. The government of Uganda has
shown consistent leadership in its mode of receiving aid and identification of areas where this aid will be well managed to make
significant impact on poverty and economic growth.
When the development objectives of the country and
donors overlap, much progress can be made in reporting on
results, and more importantly, achieving them. However, when
the desires are not congruent, this pressure can lead to results
reporting systems with a number of indicators that are not
achievable or reflective of country priorities. When these
become a condition for disbursement, especially in budget support, there is a potential for decreased predictability and
increased volatility, unfocused and perhaps less substantive programs, and erosion of the usefulness of the indicators.
At the agency level, the pressure for measuring progress
toward global goals can result in a disconnect between the
reporting requirements for donor headquarters and the principles of country ownership and partnership at the country level.
This is especially true for bilateral agencies where the pressure
from their Parliament or other politicians can result in a reporting system that is focused on attribution to agency programs/projects and in some cases incentives away from harmonization or more programmatic approaches. Due to the governance structure of the multilaterals, pressure from their
Executive Boards may work in a similar manner. At the same
time many donor agency staff members are being encouraged
to manage for results at the operational level; to use and
strengthen country systems and draw on those systems for
results reporting. This can create a disconnect within the
organization. Corporate reporting therefore needs to strike a
careful balance between providing a common framework for
systematically reporting results and ensuring flexibility in how
results are reported in any given context (see Box 4).36 Often
this is dependent on how well the country office staff has
received the corporate messages and applied them innovatively in a country context.
Ultimately donors and country partners are looking at the
same results; thus results reporting systems can: (1) supply
donors with the reporting for control systems that are fully
aligned with country monitoring and reporting mechanisms; and
(2) supply donors’ Parliaments and general public with knowledge of the national strategy and how support from donor countries is yielding results. The challenge is how to translate the format and the presentation of results to serve the needs for the
country, donors’ agencies, and Parliament/external stakeholders.
This is an area to be further explored.
FALL 2005

Less often discussed is how the domestic political aspects
of reporting results can influence country ownership and in turn
the quality of the underlying systems on which results reporting
is based. It should be recognized that what donors are promoting in partner countries in terms of a comprehensive results
framework is something few Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development members practice. In addition, the
political acceptability of a results framework with a longer term
perspective is correlated to the stage of development of the
political system. It is necessary to understand the political context and how efforts to achieve long term goals (such as universal primary education) can yield, or impede, short term political
gains. Policy making is likely to have a perspective that empha-

BOX 4:

ALIGNING COUNTRY OWNED RESULTS
TO EXTERNAL GOALS — SECTOR
EXPERIENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE
The formulation of the MTEF and the PARPA have helped
sector programs improve alignment to national objectives.
However, a recent report noted that a large proportion of
total assistance coming into the country is made up of a
multitude of uncoordinated, often donor-driven,
development and technical assistance projects. These
projects did not add up to a coherent whole, nor promote
the Government of Mozambique’s (“GOM’s”) priorities. In
addition, it was found that the GoM had incomplete
knowledge of these programs. The same report
recommends that Government “turn down low-priority
offers of 'assistance' [and] be willing to say 'no' to donors
promoting their pet projects and schemes.”
In the health sector, health related policy formulation is
conducted under the lead of the central Ministry of Health,
however, the GOM is struggling to upgrade and strengthen
its capacities to absorb additional funding and work in the
sector. Various vertical projects in malaria, tuberculosis,
leprosy, and HIV/AIDS supported by several donors are to
be integrated into a larger “communicable diseases”
program. There are functioning coordination mechanisms
and a single set of indicators to guide monitoring. Yet
donors continue to conduct separate evaluations, and
separate donor planning and coordination mechanisms also
exist. In addition, funding from newer players like GFATM,
Clinton Fund, and MAP have taken place outside the
MTEF. Multilaterals do not join pools or common funds
and continue with vertical funding arrangements.
Tony Killick, Carlos Castel-Branco, and Richard Gerster,
Perfect Partners? (2005);

OECD-DAC, Survey on H & A, Mozambique (2004);

Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation,
Mapping of SWAps in the health sector (2003).
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sizes short term benefits. Thus, supporting governments in
developing a sufficient basis for results reporting must respond
to these political dimensions and build political ownership.
Above all, results approaches must illustrate their usefulness for
achieving advances that are politically valuable in the short
term, e.g. an electoral cycle. Otherwise, there are risks that
politicians will develop alternative efforts that are not consistent
with the medium term policy outcomes and, thus, undermine
implementation of a strategy. There are several studies that
highlight the importance of engagement of Parliament and the
cabinet in implementation of MTEF.37 Additional reviews have
pointed out that sustainable monitoring and evaluation systems
require that more attention be paid to the political dimensions
and use of information in the policy process, rather than just
technical considerations.38 Yet, according to emerging evidence
in some countries, there is a rapidly increasing number of policy measures aimed at short-term political gain, with weak sometimes contradicting links to strategy objectives.39 Therefore,
innovative solutions at the country level are needed to inform
how to develop results reporting systems that are responsive to
political needs.
A key driver for harmonization around results reporting has
been earlier efforts to improve aid coordination, increase the relevance of donor programs to country owned goals, and reach
agreement on the use of common processes and procedures.
Strong government leadership has been essential in engaging
external partners in a continuous and successful dialogue
focused on making development assistance more effective. For
instance, clarity on government priorities and expected results
and trade offs made by governments can facilitate donor acceptance of less than total agreement on all strategy dimensions,
while still aligning to the country priorities. The 2005
Comprehensive Development Framework (“CDF”) evaluation
noted that this strong government leadership resulted in “development assistance agencies [being] more likely to align their
support with country priorities, harmonize their working methods with the country’s systems, and avoid supporting overlapping, competing, or non-priority efforts.”40
The translation of international commitments, such as the
Paris Declaration, from agency headquarters and to field staff
is a prerequisite for fostering a conducive environment for
country results reporting that respects country ownership and
priorities. A recent DAC survey noted that donors are basing
their assistance on country priorities, particularly where there
is ownership on the part of the country, government capacity
to lead the donors, and commitment to work differently by
donors. This type of alignment to government priorities is a
first step in establishing a similar results reporting system.
How this is done in practice varies depending on the country
circumstances. In Mozambique, the World Bank country team
responsible for piloting a results based country assistance
strategy (“CAS”) used the opportunity of a new corporate initiative – piloting the results based CAS as part of the results
agenda – to discuss with the Government and other donors
how to harmonize around a common set of indicators at the
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strategy level. This resulted in a series of discussions among
donors and government on the content of the strategy results
framework and alignment of this to the Government PARPA.
It provided the structure for in-depth examination of goals and
expectations from all sides and a discussion of how to monitor
and measure those expectations. In many instances, these

BOX 5:

LEVERAGING THE PARIS AND ROME
DECLARATION FOR MUTUAL
ACCOUNTABILITY – MOZAMBIQUE
In Mozambique, the Government and fifteen donor partners
signed a memorandum of understanding that reflects the
spirit of The New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(“NEPAD”), the Monterey Consensus, and the Rome
Declaration on Harmonization, “in a process of open
dialogue and mutual accountability.” The G15 donors
followed up on this commitment with a Programme Aid
Partners Performance Assessment (“PAPPAF”) framework.
The PAPPAF matrix identifies a set of objectives, activities,
indicators, and targets for a number of areas for donor
performance on using country systems (e.g. harmonization
and alignment). The partners are committed to providing
program aid using Mozambique’s instruments, processes,
and systems and follows the Government cycle for
planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting, and
funding. The PAPPAF allows regular monitoring by peers
and GOM to bring discipline and self-management among
the budget support group. A survey of the performance
over 2003 was carried out in 2004 and is serving as the
baseline from which to measure and monitor the trend of
donor performance.
Of fourteen indicators of donor performance set in the 2004
PAF matrix, only half were achieved. Respondents to the
2004 Survey on Harmonization and Alignment indicated
that there are several areas where greater alignment and
harmonization could occur. For example, information about
donor activities is currently widely dispersed across various
departments of the government and could be better
coordinated. The survey noted there is a need to reduce the
overlap between sector reviews and the technical teams of
the joint review if the high transaction costs facing
government are to be reduced. It also found that many of
the donors continued to work in isolation on institutional
areas. Similar trends were noted by other studies and
reviews on Mozambique. These sector study reviews stated
that although there was some progress in individual sectors,
cross-sectoral coordination was lacking in the ministries.
The number of Memorandum of Understanding PAPs have
risen to seventeen, and all PAPs are urged to improve the
overall aid effectiveness in the spirit of the MoU and the
recent Paris Declaration.
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meetings represented the first time that sector representatives
had held technical discussions with other ministries or the
Ministry of Finance. During this process the World Bank and
the Government’s team engaged in a process of prioritization
and selection and settled for trade-offs that were acceptable to
everyone. The team was able to achieve 70 percent alignment
of indicators by the time of presentation of the strategy to the
World Bank Board, while committing to increase this alignment during implementation. At the same time, the team met
guidelines of the corporate reporting system being piloted.
This corporate reporting system allowed flexibility in identification of the targets and indicators, while maintaining technical rigor in the method applied to evaluation.

FACTOR THREE: PROGRAMMATIC SUPPORT FOR
CAPACITY BUILDING IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION

As countries move to a stronger results orientation in their
strategy development and planning processes – supported by
the donor community – their capacity to do so must grow exponentially. On the donor side, the evolution within agencies to a
stronger results orientation in their assistance strategies and
increasing reliance on country monitoring systems further
underlines the importance of coordination for capacity building. This is coupled with the probability of budget support
playing a much larger role in aid disbursements underpinning
the need to strengthen public sector management mechanisms,
including project analysis, budgeting, reporting, and M&E.
Developing monitoring and evaluation capacity is a long term
process and making incremental progress sustainable requires
ownership by government.
Monitoring systems by themselves may not contribute very
much to the enhancement of development effectiveness, unless
procedures are in place for the results from monitoring to feed
into policy making and decision-making processes of governments and donors. Institutionalization of the evaluation function
is equally important for harmonization around results, as much
of evaluation in country is carried out in a somewhat ad hoc
manner. The strategies used to introduce results-based management have varied across countries; however, there are similar
elements that contribute to a successful shift to a results-based
culture, and well-established strategies to move the results agenda forward. These include:
• A clear mandate for deepening the results approach
within the governance system. This may include the
presence of strong leadership, usually through a
strong champion(s) at the most senior level of government. It may also be driven by economic pressures or other incentives for change (often, a concerned citizenry or the need to reduce the cost of burdensome civil service payrolls).

• Clear links to budget and other resource allocation
decisions. This implies greater interconnectivity
between government institutions and more transparent resource management systems.
FALL 2005

• A results oriented culture and supporting organizational structures. The culture within countries may not
value a focus on results. Agencies may lack sufficient
administrative and organizational structures to support
using results-based information for planning, management, and resource allocation decisions.
• Involvement of civil society as an important partner
with government.

• Pockets of innovation that can serve as beginning
practices or pilot programs.

• The capacity to define a national strategy aligned to
sector, regional, and local planning is often weak. The
move to an increasing role for local governments in
service delivery necessitates better linkages to planning and management at lower levels of government
– where capacity may be weak.

• The ability to design and maintain supporting statistical systems is weak and there is not an adequate a
results-based workforce to develop and support
information systems for sustained use. Often, government officials do not have the training or legal
frameworks for modern data management to support
a results-based management system. In many countries development data are collected by different
institutions with little coordination on time periods
and statistical methods, thus undermining reliability
of results reporting.

There are three actions that the donor community and countries can take to foster country ownership while meeting the
need for external reporting. First, the donor community and
country can undertake joint assessment of country capacity for
monitoring and evaluation capacity that are essential for results
reporting. This country capacity should be meaningful in the
country context and develop capacity building and includes the
identification of relevant and viable indicators, the capacity to
organize timely, efficient, “lean” data collection mechanisms,
the capacity to assess in a meaningful way what actual observations on those indicators would tell, the capacity to formulate
meaningful policy advice on the basis of observed trends, and
the capacity to formulate evaluation needs. Second, donors can
operationalize joint work and mutual accountability by scaling
up M&E systems from project to sector to country level; for
example, by supporting the integration of project-level M&E
systems into line ministries structures. Third, the donor community and country can sign a memorandum of understanding with
development partners on how support for M&E, whether project, program, or institutional, will strengthen country systems in
a sustainable manner.

CONCLUSION

The review of the processes and current environment
around harmonization of results reporting reveals that the impetus for building harmonized systems around results reporting is
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not limited to defining indicators and agreeing on measurement.
Instead, harmonization around results reporting is part of a
broader political and economic context, both in country and in
the international community that points to the necessity to balance the external reporting needs with domestic accountability
and position results reporting within the country’s development
agenda, systems, and capacity to deliver evidence of results. The
four cases (Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar)
and an in depth literature and documentation review drove to
identification of factors and actions that are needed to make har-

monization around results reporting work in practice. Against
each action the cases provided examples that can be turned into
specific interventions for the development community. These
factors consider the interrelationship between the country context and the international context in a way that is supportive of
improving country systems.
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